Wire and Bead

A fragile coalition holds, reforms inch forward, and November’s municipal polls will test whether pragmatism can outlast crisis

South Africa entered a new political era on 29 May 2024, when voters ended three decades of African National Congress (ANC) dominance in the National Assembly. The ANC won 159 of 400 seats—about 40% of the vote—while the Democratic Alliance (DA) took 87 seats, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) 58, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 39 (IPU Parline: 2024 National Assembly election). With no outright winner, President Cyril Ramaphosa formed a Government of National Unity (GNU) that eventually drew in ten parties, giving the arrangement a working majority of roughly 72% of seats (2024 South African general election). Nearly two years on, the question is not whether coalition politics has arrived—it has—but whether it can deliver stable governance, fiscal discipline, and the service improvements voters expect.

Coalition under strain, but still standing

The GNU’s first year has been marked by repeated near-breakdowns rather than smooth consensus. Budget 2025 became the defining stress test: Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana proposed raising value-added tax (VAT) by half a percentage point to 15.5%, arguing that revenue was needed amid a wider fiscal squeeze. The DA opposed the hike, took the matter to court, and threatened to leave government, warning it would burden the poor (BBC: ANC U-turn over tax that threatened South Africa's government). Smaller GNU partners and the ANC’s trade-union ally COSATU also pushed back. In late April 2025, Treasury scrapped the increase—a climbdown that averted an unprecedented parliamentary defeat of the national budget but left a R13.5 billion gap to fill and forced difficult spending choices (BBC: ANC U-turn over tax that threatened South Africa's government).

Analysts described the episode as a warning sign. The Citizen reported that the budget impasse shook investor confidence and put the GNU “on thin ice,” noting that the arrangement rests on a statement of intent rather than a formal coalition contract (The Citizen: Budget 2025 shook confidence in SA’s fiscal stability). Daily Maverick, reviewing the GNU’s first anniversary in June 2025, concluded that “serial crises and continual turmoil” had become the normal mode of coalition politics—yet also argued the GNU was “predisposed to persist,” potentially through the 2026 local elections and into the next ANC leadership transition (Daily Maverick: The GNU at one). In other words, the centre is holding, but only through constant negotiation.

A constitutional test over Phala Phala

In May 2026, a separate challenge arrived from the courts. The Constitutional Court ruled that National Assembly Rule 129I was unconstitutional and set aside a December 2022 vote that had blocked referral of an independent panel report on the Phala Phala matter—allegations concerning foreign currency stolen from Ramaphosa’s private game farm—to a full impeachment committee (Constitutional Court judgment CCT35/24). The panel had found in 2022 that there were prima facie grounds to investigate whether the president may have committed serious misconduct (Sunday Times: ConCourt rules Phala Phala impeachment vote unconstitutional). Speaker Thoko Didiza moved to implement the court’s order and refer the report to a 31-member impeachment committee (Parliament of South Africa: Speaker determines process). Ramaphosa said he would take the panel report on review, as the court’s order allowed (Politicsweb: Phala Phala — Ramaphosa to take report on review).

For the GNU, the ruling poses a loyalty test. Newly elected DA leader Geordin Hill-Lewis, also mayor of Cape Town, said his party would participate constructively in the impeachment committee, guided by evidence and constitutional duty (Sunday Independent: Can the GNU hold Ramaphosa accountable?). Academic observers have asked whether coalition partners will prioritise constitutional accountability or protect the power-sharing arrangement they built after 2024 (Sunday Independent: Can the GNU hold Ramaphosa accountable?). The impeachment process may take months; its outcome is uncertain. What is clear is that South Africa’s institutions—not party bosses alone—will help determine how the GNU weathers the storm.

Reforms moving, but not fast enough

Away from the headlines, government has continued a structural-reform programme called Operation Vulindlela, a joint Presidency and National Treasury initiative focused on electricity, logistics, water, visas, local government, and digital transformation (Summary of Operation Vulindlela). Ramaphosa launched Phase II in May 2025, pledging that the GNU would sustain reform momentum (South African Government: Launch of Operation Vulindlela Phase II). Progress reports show a mixed picture: in the fourth quarter of 2025, about 67% of tracked reforms were on track, while energy and logistics lagged and roughly 20% of reforms were delayed (Engineering News: Operation Vulindlela reforms progressing). Financial Mail noted wins—including steps toward a competitive electricity market and private rail access—but also persistent bottlenecks in freight logistics and slow institutional setup (Financial Mail: Still mixed results for Operation Vulindlela). For ordinary South Africans, the practical test is whether reforms translate into fewer blackouts, more reliable ports and rail, and better municipal services—not just policy announcements.

November 2026: the next electoral reckoning

The country’s immediate political horizon is municipal. Ramaphosa has set 4 November 2026 as the date for local government elections, completing the five-year term that began with the 2021 polls (SAnews: President sets 4 November 2026 as date for Local Government Elections). The Independent Electoral Commission scheduled a national voter-registration weekend for 20–21 June 2026, with more than 200,000 new voters having registered online since November 2025, many of them young (Statistics South Africa: Mbalo Brief, March 2026). These will be the first local elections since the GNU was formed; ward-level contests historically turn on water, roads, refuse collection, and other daily failures that national coalitions cannot easily fix from Pretoria.

Polling presents a nuanced picture. Separate surveys cited by the BBC in April 2025 placed ANC support as low as 29.7% to 32%—well below the 40% it won in 2024 (BBC: ANC U-turn over tax that threatened South Africa's government). Yet March 2026 polling by The Common Sense and the Social Research Foundation found that a majority of respondents rated both the ANC and the DA positively for their GNU performance, and that public support for the coalition idea itself has remained relatively strong (The Common Sense: Voters positive about DA and ANC in the GNU). South Africans appear willing to give power-sharing a chance, even as commentators focus on friction.

Where the country is headed

Taken together, the evidence points to a country navigating an extended transition—not a sudden collapse, and not a return to single-party rule. The GNU is likely to survive its current crises through compromise, as it did over VAT, but each compromise carries a cost in fiscal credibility or policy coherence. Constitutional processes over Phala Phala will test whether accountability and coalition discipline can coexist. Operation Vulindlela offers a plausible path to higher growth if implementation accelerates, but delivery remains uneven. And in November, voters—not party negotiators—will deliver the next verdict at the ballot box.

South Africa is headed toward a politics of permanent negotiation: hung parliaments, shared cabinets, and opposition parties both inside and outside government. That is neither inherently unstable nor inherently successful. The country’s direction will depend on whether leaders treat coalition management as a substitute for governance or as a framework within which reforms, budgets, and accountability can still be pursued. The next six months will go a long way toward answering that question.

South African politics, where is the country headed

Coalition under strain, but still standing

A constitutional test over Phala Phala

Reforms moving, but not fast enough

November 2026: the next electoral reckoning

Where the country is headed

References

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